Mr. Chairman,

May I, at the very outset, extend to you our congratulations upon your election to this important post. You may rest assured that my delegation stands ready to assist you in carrying out your responsible task. Our congratulations go to the other members of the Bureau, as well.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation fully shares the position that has just been pronounced by the distinguished representative of Spain, who spoke on behalf of the European Union as well as the associated States, including the Republic of Hungary. This coincidence of views is based on the fact that my country associates itself with the values of the European, Euro-Atlantic community of nations. Consequently EU and NATO aspirations are in full harmony with the principles of the Hungarian security philosophy and policy, and the positions represented by these organizations are, in most of the cases, identical with our concrete political objectives.

Hungary, too, would like to see the emergence of a new European security architecture, an international security system built upon cooperation among States and international organizations and institutions. We are convinced that with the ideological divisions gone, the spirit of cooperation should prevail over confrontation in international relations because it is in the best genuine interest of all nations. Thus security policies based on national interests, must be cooperation-oriented per se.

Mr. Chairman,

It is in this spirit that we are convinced that the arms control and disarmament process must remain an integral part of our security policy agenda. We do believe that arms control continues to be a major pillar of security and stability. Therefore one of the challenges the international community has to face today is to see to it that existing arms control treaties are fully implemented and their implementation is properly verified, old obligations are adapted to new realities and requirements, and new agreements, new commitments are elaborated, where appropriate.

The general debate of the First Committee takes place at a time when it is especially opportune for taking stock of our accomplishments and challenges and for devising plans for the future. We have arrived to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations with impressive gains made during the previous few years in the field of disarmament. Agreements to limit the proliferation of many types of weapons have been achieved at a more promising pace than ever before. Hand in hand with the ongoing transformations in the global political climate, a window of opportunity has opened before us to achieve security at lower levels of armaments. Consequently, we are facing also an increasing necessity to reassess our thinking on and approaches to the whole process of disarmament.

As 1995 draws to a close, we may certainly come to the conclusion that this was a year when the international community has become more alert and attentive to the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and shown firm determination to act against those risks. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is perhaps the most telling example to this effect. My Government has always assigned highest priority to this goal and worked vigorously towards its achievement. We are deeply convinced that by making the NPT into a treaty of unlimited duration the States Parties ensured its continued role as the major international legal instrument providing a basic guarantee for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. The indefinitely extended Treaty, together with the strengthened review mechanism will undoubtedly add a major element of stability to the emerging new international security system. Let me reiterate here: Hungary is committed to the full implementation of the resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in all their aspects.

There is no doubt that the success of the follow-up will be judged on the basis of the progress towards new significant measures relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The early conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes are goals that, in our view, should continue to be high on the disarmament agenda.

Hungary welcomes the acceleration of the work accomplished in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the increasing support for obtaining the signing of the CTBT before the end of the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. This would constitute a clear-cut demonstration of the will and ability of the international community to successfully address yet another aspect of the threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction.

We look forward to the resumption of the CTBT negotiations in January 1996 when the Conference on Disarmament returns to session. Although we firmly believe that progress towards this new international legal instrument banning nuclear test explosions in a verifiable and comprehensive manner is well-advanced and irreversible, important political decisions on key treaty elements have yet to be taken in order to meet the deadline set by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. As positive moves in this direction, we would like to refer to the decisions of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France to support a truly comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, including low-yield explosions, and the recent French commitment to sign such a treaty by autumn 1996. This bodes well for the future prospects of the Geneva talks. We are hopeful that the intersessional period will allow appropriate time for the other nuclear weapon states to reflect on these developments and consequently they will also contribute to this trend of convergence of positions on the scope of a CTBT.

At the same time, we cannot but express our regret over the fact that the unilateral commitments to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions are not maintained by all, and some of the nuclear weapon states decided to change their policies in this field. At this juncture, we would like to stress the importance of exercising utmost restraint with regard to nuclear testing as a factor conducive to the early conclusion of a CTBT.

As far as another aspect of the current agenda for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is concerned, my Government attaches great importance to the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. As one of the major items of the programme of action adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference, it should be the subject of urgent negotiation. It is most unfortunate that in spite of the encouraging consensus decisions on the subject earlier this year in the Conference on Disarmament, we witness a further delay in the commencement of the work. Hungary believes that a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable cut-off treaty is realistically achievable in a relatively short period of time. It would cap the amount of weapon-grade material, and the verification measures would extend international safeguards to new facilities. We add our voice to those who urge the Conference on Disarmament to implement General Assembly resolution 48/75 L.

Mr. Chairman,

One of the positive results of the profound transformation in recent years of the security agenda is the increasing significance attached to the notion of verification for international arms control and disarmament agreements. It clearly indicates the general recognition of the fact that properly functioning effective mechanisms of international verification are essential for ensuring compliance with the obligations deriving from various treaties and for building confidence among States.

Hungary is in a special position to highly appreciate such a trend. For a number of years we have been witness to the positive effects of an elaborate disarmament verification system, namely that of the CFE. Our experience has undoubtedly proved that this kind of mechanism in itself may positively contribute to the security of the region involved. It is in this spirit that we welcome the prospects of concluding a CTBT with an elaborated, strict and non-discriminatory international verification system, something like the one already in force within the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

It is also in accordance with this approach that Hungary actively participates in the efforts aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by elaborating its verification mechanism. The work of the Ad Hoc Group that Hungary has the honour to chair, has taken a good start. It has identified the crucial issues for further deliberations, and prepared the ground for substantive negotiations on the elements of a possible verification protocol. Hungary advocates the speeding up of this work which, as we hope, may result in the submission of specific proposals for consideration and adoption by the upcoming Review Conference next year.

Mr. Chairman,

Hungary shares the concerns about the enormous global problem caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land mines and calls for urgent international efforts to resolutely address this issue. We express our readiness to contribute actively to joint actions of the international community, be it in the framework of the United Nations or other arrangements. At the International Meeting on Mine Clearance, held in July 1995 in Geneva, we outlined our proposals for our participation in the corresponding programme of the UN.

Another way of tackling the mine issue is the strengthening of the major instrument of international humanitarian law in this respect. Hungary took its share of responsibility and participated actively in the first phase of the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Our expectation was to achieve a major step forward in further restricting or prohibiting the use and transfer of those categories and types of anti-personnel land mines which present the most dangers to civilians. We cannot conceal our disappointment over the failure of the negotiations last week in Vienna. We also believe that the momentum and the achievements of the first part of the Conference should be preserved. At the same time we welcome the adoption of a new Protocol on blinding laser weapons which again proves the determination of the international community to bring the obligations under the rules of war in line with the progress of military technology in past decades.

Mr. Chairman,

In his supplement to "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General of the United Nations drew attention to the need for the so-called "micro-disarmament", that is the need for establishing more effective ways to combat the illicit transfer and acquisition of small, conventional weapons. Indeed, it has become rather disturbing by now to realize the potential of such transfers and requisitions to disrupt national, regional and even international peace and stability. Hence, Hungary believes that in addition to the recent encouraging development of transparency measures in the field of conventional armaments, a further refinement of the functioning of the conventional-weapons Register and an extension of its scope would serve as a new and useful means for confidence and stability building both on a global scale and on a regional level. That is why, regarding this issue, we are looking forward with great interest to the new draft resolution the EU Presidency alluded to just a while ago.

I fully agree with the view expressed by the previous speaker that, with all probability, it is on the regional level that increased confidence and greater transparency in military matters have the most significant positive effects, especially as far as conventional weaponry is concerned. That is why we attribute special importance to the results achieved within the framework of regional organizations. Representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, I am proud to refer here to the achievements of the summit of that organization held in Budapest last December, such as the adoption of a "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security", or the common determination of its member states to develop further those confidence building measures that are already included in the Vienna Document of 1994.

Nevertheless, we are also convinced that even more concerted actions and measures are needed on the regional and subregional level, first and foremost in the context of conflict-ridden areas. Let me recall here that the OSCE has already received a mandate to address specific regional security problems, with special emphasis on longer-term stability in South-Eastern Europe. In this context, we attribute vital importance to the early establishment of arrangements to reduce conventional armaments on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot imagine a lasting solution to the tragic war there, unless we are able to introduce, in the settlement process, a treaty limiting the armed forces of the states that have emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, also including their neighbors and, may be, some other states too. An effective control of the massive arms stockpiles of that subregion would also serve as a prerequisite for a smooth implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This treaty has been and will remain a basic pillar of European security and stability, even if it is in need of some adjustments, as discussed these weeks in Vienna.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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