Mr. President,

May I extend to you our congratulations on your election to the prestigious post of President of the Conference, a meeting of historic importance. Your skills and devotion to the subject are strong assurances for a purpose-oriented and successful outcome.

Mr. President,

For the last twenty-five years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been an outstanding testimony to the fact that States can overcome difficulties and can find mutually acceptable solutions even to the most complex problems if they realize the extraordinary nature of the challenges before them. In the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the stake was and has, in fact, remained the very survival of mankind.

The Treaty required significant efforts and a long and arduous process of negotiations. The participants included nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, large and small, developed and developing countries, divided also by conflicting philosophies and politico-military aspirations. Against all odds and obstacles, they finally managed to agree. The final text of the Treaty is an exemplary compromise, not fully satisfactory to anyone but highly satisfactory to all. It incorporates a host of commitments and objectives. The most important feature, however, is the historic agreement that the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be prevented.

Mr. President,

Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the participants are once again brought together by a similar agreement. Namely, that they are in dire need of a durable and dependable Treaty that can serve as a solid basis of their security and the security of the whole world.

Today, when this Conference, a gathering of the largest number of States in history that have ever become parties to an international treaty, is called upon to decide on the future of the operation of the NPT, we are convinced that the real interests of the States call for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. In this connection, I would venture to suggest that even those States that, for some reason or another, have not yet adhered to the NPT will also be well served if the Treaty is turned into a permanent basis of a global security system. The fundamental significance of the Treaty is acknowledged by all. Nobody can deny that without the NPT in force, the conclusion of a number of arms control and disarmament agreements would have been more difficult. And nobody can deny that without the NPT continuing to be in force in the future, our efforts to create a new system of international relations would be strongly jeopardized. It is our common future, therefore, that calls for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Indefinite extension without any linkages or conditions. When we reject the idea of linking the extension of the Treaty to certain achievements in other negotiations, we do not, in any manner, wish to deny the necessity of conducting those negotiations with the greatest resolve. We are second to none in stating the urgent need to conclude further treaties of nuclear arms control and disarmament, which will serve as additional building blocks in the global structure of nuclear stability. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament has entered a promising new phase of intensive and meaningful negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and there are hopeful signs for the beginning of negotiations on a global, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives. Further, we have noted with satisfaction the strong commitment of the two Powers parties to START I and II to implement those treaties, and also to explore further drastic cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Among the important steps and measures taken more recently, I wish to welcome whole-heartedly Resolution 984 (1995) of the Security Council. In this regard, the concerted action of the five permanent members is a major contribution towards providing additional security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States, thus creating better conditions and an improved political atmosphere for the successful completion of the tasks before this Conference and securing more progress in negotiations. All these measures will be key elements in reducing nuclear risks, and would constitute important contributions to fulfilling our common obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Let me state once again in no uncertain terms that, while we readily recognize the urgency of all these measures, we cannot accept the notion that the indefinite extension of the Treaty should be linked to them in any manner. The NPT is a fundamental instrument for global stability and security, too important to be jeopardized in any way or be subjugated to any other measures.

If there is any room for some kind of a linkage, it is to be found in the opposite direction. The indefinite extension of the NPT is a vital requirement to maintain the conditions and atmosphere necessary for progress in negotiations.

Mr. President,

The Hungarian delegation fully shares the position that has been set forward only a short while ago by the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, M. Alain Juppé, who spoke on behalf of the European Union as well as the associated States, including the Republic of Hungary. I wish to underscore that the threats to global and regional security are not limited to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The grave problems and challenges associated with the enormous stockpiles of conventional weapons, and their proliferation are being felt dramatically in a number of regions of our world. In spite of the remarkably successful implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), there are other problems elsewhere yet to be solved. While the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is pursuing in its region genuine efforts to that end, serious work should also be conducted in other areas of the world in order to address the rapidly growing global menace of conventional arms proliferation.

Mr. President,

May I turn now briefly to some specific issues concerning Hungary's activities and experiences in NPT verification and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hungary has always attached great importance to the effective verification of obligations voluntarily undertaken in international agreements, including those in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Credible, continuously functioning and internationally recognized arrangements have the potential of building confidence among States, thus creating favourable conditions for international cooperation, including in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Since the conclusion of the NPT, the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency has served as a cornerstone of providing non-proliferation assurances. We commend the IAEA for it. We call for the universal application of IAEA safeguards, and urge all States Parties to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency. Hungary welcomes the recent unilateral offer to place under IAEA safeguards fissile materials released from weapons programmes and encourages all nuclear-weapon States to submit their peaceful nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards under the voluntary offer agreements. Pursuing a policy of openness and transparency, Hungary has, from the very beginning, cooperated fully with the Agency in developing and operating this important verification and confidence-building mechanism. We have introduced several unilateral measures, removing restrictions on the designation of inspectors and facilitating the political and technical requirements for IAEA inspections. Nowadays, when effective verification of the non-proliferation commitments is becoming ever more important, Hungary continues to support the Agency's efforts to improve and strengthen the existing safeguards, and has volunteered to offer its nuclear installations to test new verification and safeguards approaches and technologies. In light of the bitter experiences of non-compliance with NPT-related safeguards obligations, my Government joined those who have called for an improved IAEA safeguards system capable of providing credible assurances regarding not only declared nuclear activities, but also the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

Mr. President,

Hungary has been a committed advocate of various efforts aimed at further strengthening elements of the NPT-based non-proliferation regime. In response to the consensus view expressed at the 1990 NPT Review Conference, the principle of full-scope safeguards, as a condition of supply for any significant new nuclear export, has been incorporated into our export licensing regulation and practice. The implementation of the agreed common policy of supplier-States and its continuous up-dating do facilitate cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by enhancing confidence that nuclear export will not contribute to an unsafeguarded fuel cycle or any weapons-related activities.

Recently, the new phenomenon of illicit transfer and smuggling of nuclear materials has appeared on the horizon, posing challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that if that new emerging danger is to be stemmed and eliminated, an increased physical protection system of nuclear materials should be introduced in all countries, coupled with a higher level of international cooperation. Hungary is ready to act accordingly.

In the course of the last decades, Hungary has become a country where nuclear power generation provides about one half of the total electricity production, and advanced nuclear-related scientific activities have developed. A significant part of our achievements in the nuclear field has been accomplished through international co-operation. NPT has greatly promoted bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation aimed at using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We remain committed to the continuation of the broadest cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy with all those countries that respect the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation.

In conclusion, Mr. President, speaking in my capacity of Chairman-in-Office for 1995 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, I wish to call the Conference's attention to the working paper that has been circulated at my request. The document contains the relevant section of the Declaration adopted in December 1994 by the Heads of State or Government at the Budapest Summit of the OSCE participating States. Section VI, entitled "Principles Governing Non-Proliferation", reflects the strong belief of those 52 States that the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the missile systems to deliver them, poses a real threat to international peace, security and stability. They affirm, therefore, their commitment to "implement fully all their existing undertakings in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control", as well as their view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty "should be indefinitely and unconditionally extended".

Thank you, Mr. President.

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